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ABSTRACT
The Centers for Disease Control defines syndromic surveillance as, “an investigational approach where health department
staff, assisted by automated data acquisition and generation of statistical alerts, monitor disease indicators in real-time or near
real-time to detect outbreaks of disease earlier than would otherwise be possible with traditional public health methods”
(CDC, 2004). While syndromic surveillance has traditionally been used in the context of detecting natural outbreaks, it is
increasingly being used to develop systems to detect bioterrorism outbreaks. Timely response to a bioterrorism event requires
accurate information exchange between clinicians and public health officials. This entails building highly complex
surveillance systems that provide access to heterogeneous/distributed medical data, computational resources and
collaborative services, for real-time decision making in a highly reliable and secure environment.  In this paper we
propose enhancing syndromic surveillance through grid and autonomic computing augmentations, and present our approach
to a proof of concept modeling and simulation environment.
Keywords
syndromic surveillance, grid computing, autonomic computing.
1. INTRODUCTION
Bioterrorism attacks are low-probability, high-impact events where time is of the essence. The effectiveness of intervention
depends on how quickly an epidemic can be detected, how well it can be characterized, and how rapidly a response is
initiated (Buckeridge, Graham, O'Connor, Choy, Tu and Musen, 2002). In the case of an Anthrax outbreak, while pre-
diagnostic data maybe available one day after exposure, diagnostic data may not be available until day 4, and death may
occur  as  early  as  day  6  (Teich,  Wagner,  Mackenzie  and  Schafer,  2002).  Since  Anthrax  is  most  treatable  early  on,  timely
detection and control of an outbreak is critical.
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Surveillance systems need to continuously monitor different sources of pre-diagnostic data, analyze this data for the
possibility of an outbreak, and should an outbreak be detected, plan a coordinated response. These tasks are non-trivial. Pre-
diagnostic (and diagnostic) data is typically heterogeneous, distributed and voluminous. Analysis of the data involves
computationally intensive statistical modeling and simulation of spatio-temporal syndromic data. Detection has to be low on
false-positives and false-negatives. Both the analysis and detection tasks are knowledge intensive and place considerable
cognitive burden on decision-makers. Of prime importance is also the maintenance of data privacy, confidentiality and
security.
This research-in-progress focuses on developing system artifacts to reduce the cognitive burden on decision-makers involved
in surveillance activities.  An Autonomic Health Grid system is proposed as a means of enhancing syndromic surveillance,
and a modeling and simulation environment that will be used to evaluate implications of performance characteristics on
surveillance effectiveness. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some of the challenges faced by syndromic
surveillance. Section 3 briefly discusses the autonomic grid computing paradigm as a possible enhancement. Section 4 details
the proposed Autonomic Health Grid and suggests a conceptual model. Section 5 describes our approach to simulation and
modeling in this domain context.
2. SYNDROMIC SURVEILLANCE
This section provides a brief summary of techniques and challenges faced in syndromic surveillance. Figure 1 draws on
earlier work (Buckeridge et al., 2002; CDC, 2004) to show the process flow in a surveillance system.
Figure 1. Process Flow
CDC has identified 5 “category-A” bioterrorism agents: inhalation anthrax, tularemia, pneumonic plague, botulism and
smallpox. They have varying incubation periods, prodromes (early symptoms), and post-prodrome disease progression
(Buehler, Berkelman, Hartley and Peters, 2003). Since syndromic surveillance relies on detection of outbreaks through early
symptom identification, 11 syndrome categories related to category-A agents have been identified (e.g., botulism-like,
hemorrhagic illness, neurological, rash, fever, and severe illness or death). These syndrome categories manifest themselves in
different kinds of data depending on the time elapsed from the moment of exposure. Figure 2 draws on earlier work
(Buckeridge et al., 2002; Reis and Mandl, 2003) to depict this time dependency of data sources. It is also essential to capture
the geographic spread of the outbreak and the demographics of the affected population. While many of the data sources are
currently non-standard, there have been numerous efforts at data standardization in recent years (such as ICD-9-CM, LOINC,
UMLS, SNOMED, HL-7).
Figure 2. Data Flow
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Data analyses involve pre-processing (filtering and transformation), syndromic grouping (one of 11 syndrome categories),
spatio-temporal registration and normalization (accounting for expected variation in data). Tasks such as syndromic grouping
are knowledge-intensive and require the application of domain-specific knowledge. Pure statistical analyses would not
suffice in this case. A few systems have therefore used an ontological knowledge based approach to syndromic grouping
(Buckeridge et al., 2002).
The goal of outbreak detection is to distinguish an abnormal pattern from a normal one. Syndromic surveillance approaches
focus on detecting time and/or space clustering of outbreaks, i.e., a higher than expected number or rate of events than what is
considered “normal” (Moore, Cooper, Tsui and Wagner, 2002). However, much like syndromic grouping, outbreak detection
is an equally knowledge-intensive process that requires syndromic and epidemiological domain-specific knowledge. Thus the
development of an ontological knowledge based approach would be valuable.
If an outbreak is detected, the next step involves epidemiological analysis, interpretation and investigation. Investigation
involves the rules, procedures, and tools that support decision-making in response to a system signal, including adequate
staffing with trained epidemiologists who can review, explore, and interpret the data in a timely manner (CDC, 2004).
Finally, the surveillance system needs to be evaluated across the following criteria: (1) Sensitivity (the likelihood of a
positive result when testing a sample containing a bio-threat agent); (2) Specificity (the likelihood of a negative result when
testing a sample that does not contain a bio-threat agent) (Bravata et al., 2002); (3) Timeliness (lapse of time from exposure
to the initiation of a public health intervention) (4) Flexibility (adaptability to changing needs and risk thresholds); (5)
Usefulness (demonstrated value relevant to public health); (6) Cost (Sosin, 2003).
3. AUTONOMIC GRID COMPUTING
Grid computing has been defined as “flexible, secure, coordinated resource sharing among dynamic collections of
individuals, institutions, and resources” (Foster, Kesselman and Tuecke, 2001). We direct the reader to (Foster et al., 2001;
GLOBUS) for a more complete overview of the grid architecture and available middleware. The grid architecture can be used
to address the data and computational concerns described above (HealthGrid). However, by bringing together distributed,
heterogeneous, dynamic systems to serve its purpose, the grid is inherently a complex environment to manage (Agarwal et
al., 2003).
Autonomic computing has been suggested as a new paradigm to deal with the ever increasing complexity in today’s systems.
Autonomic Grids are currently being researched and at least two middleware systems have been suggested: OptimalGrid
(Deen, Lehman and Kaufman, 2003) and AutoMate (Agarwal et al., 2003). We provide a brief summary of autonomic
computing here, and direct the reader to (Kephart, Chess, 2003; White, Hanson, Whalley, Chess and Kephart, 2004) for a
more complete overview. Autonomic systems are a collection of managed elements (such as CPU, database, business), that
monitor their environment, analyze the data, plan a course of action and then execute it (known as the MAPE model).
Elements can interact only through their specified interfaces. These systems are required to be self-managing (self-
configuring, self-optimizing, self-healing and self-protecting) and capable of establishing and maintaining relationships with
other autonomic elements. Everything in an autonomic system is done in accordance with high-level policies (representation
in a standard external form of desired behaviors or constraints on behavior) set forth by human administrators. The MAPE
model also assumes the existence of a common knowledge base that is shared among the four components of this model. In
this context, an ontological knowledge base would allow for inferential capabilities and flexibility (Stojanovic et al., 2004).
4. AUTONOMIC HEALTH GRIDS
In an attempt to enhance syndrome surveillance systems with the autonomic grid architecture, a design of the Autonomic
Health Grid as a self-managing system that is based on the MAPE model and uses the grid architecture is described in this
section.  Figure 3 is a conceptualization of our framework (for one level of hierarchy).
We consider every data source as a policy-driven autonomic managed element. Hence, hospitals, pharmacies, schools etc will
each be autonomic elements that monitor-analyze-plan-execute. Each autonomic element monitors its own data. Analysis
may be limited to preprocessing the data for the central surveillance system, and perhaps advising it of possible
discrepancies. The central surveillance system then gathers all this data and associated advisories from various autonomic
elements and analyzes the sum-total of data for an outbreak. If an outbreak is suspected, the central system might then ask for
additional data from the autonomic elements. Having established an outbreak, the central system will then draw out a plan of
action and execution that will then tap into the planning and execution phases of the autonomic elements’ individual MAPE
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cycles. Hence, the central system will end up controlling and changing the system states of the autonomic elements. Each
element will also continuously learn from failures and update its knowledge base.
This approach has several advantages: (1) Autonomous - each autonomic element can manage its own policy-driven goals.
(2) Scalable – each autonomic element can in turn automate other processes within it until the entire system is fully
autonomic, allowing for a natural evolution of a fully autonomic system. (3) Self-configuring – the system will use a goal-
driven self-assembly approach (White et al., 2004) based on a central registry. Before each element joins the system, it is
given a high-level description of its goal (possibly by the central system, such as “monitor this demographic for this data”),
and how to contact the registry. If the element is ready to commit to these goals, it registers itself, and starts collaborating
with the central system via the MAPE cycle. The element may also choose to leave the registry subsequently. (4) Self-healing
– if an autonomic element should fail, or choose to leave the registry, the surveillance system will then look for other data
sources in that geographical area via the registry. It may also adapt its analysis to accommodate the failure. (5) Self-
optimizing (in terms of performance, efficiency, cost) - an autonomic system will likely improve performance and efficiency
by streamlining the processes within each autonomic element in order to become self-managing, and autonomic grids will
bring down costs in terms of virtualizing resources and managing these complex systems. (6) Self-protecting (in terms of data
privacy, confidentiality, protection) - by making each data source an anonymous, autonomic element that defines its own
interfaces with other elements in the system, the data source is in complete control of its data.
Figure 3. Autonomic Surveillance System
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5. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
In extending this effort, a proof of concept simulation and modeling environment is being developed.  In the planned setup,
autonomic elements will be viewed as agents, and the autonomic surveillance system as a multi-agent system. This will be
simulated (Carley et al., 2003; O’Toole, Mair and Inglesby, 2002; Goel, Belardo and Iwan, 2004) using the agent simulation
toolkit, Repast (Collier, 2002). Repast has numerous packages, notably, the analysis package for data collection, the engine
package for setting up, manipulating and driving the simulation, the network package to build network simulations, and the
space package to simulate spatial relationships. Input data will be modeled based on real longitudinal data at our disposal.
This data will then be perturbed (at various data points) to simulate a bio-aerosol inhalation anthrax attack based on
inhalation anthrax syndrome characteristics as described in (Teich et al., 2002; Anthrax Factsheet). Through this period, the
autonomic elements will continue “monitoring” their data, analyzing it, and reporting discrepancies based on a simple
threshold mechanism. The central surveillance element will gather this data and run it through a spatio-temporal detection
algorithm. Based on the detection of an outbreak, it will then plan and execute an action that changes the state of the
autonomic elements. We will use this environment to study the following. Does having a dynamic registry mechanism afford
flexibility and fault tolerance in terms of node failures? How does a policy-driven mechanism compare to micro-managing
the elements? How can we build the knowledge bases of each of these autonomic elements? How can we make them
adaptable to change? Can we show that syndromic and epidemiological ontologies will increase the specificity and sensitivity
of our system? Does this architecture alleviate the cognitive dissonance among distributed decision makers?
This paper summarized the challenges faced by syndromic surveillance and how autonomic grids can be used to enhance
these systems. A conceptual model was proposed. Finally, a simulation and modeling environment was described to test the
proof of concept.
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